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ABSTRACT: Currently in the state of New South Wales (NSW) local 
government councils have the authority to invest ratepayers‟ money.  At the end 
of 2006-07 financial year local councils in NSW had invested $590 million 
dollars in structured financial products such as collateralised debt obligations 
(CDO).  Six months later the market value of these investments dropped $200 
million to $390 million.  In the light of these significant losses the NSW state 
government commissioned a review of the financial investments of NSW local 
councils to be undertaken.  The Review, Cole Report, published in 2008 found 
that while acting within the parameters of the Local Government Act (1993), 
local councils had pursued high return high risk investment strategies.  This 
paper reviews and evaluates how the local councils in NSW, identified by Cole 
as having a high level of financial exposure to investments such as CDOs, have 
disclosed their financial investments in their 2007-08 financial reports and the 
type of audit opinion issued on their general purpose financial reports.  This 
paper will contribute to the literature on the 2008 global financial crisis as well 
as literature on Local Government council financial report audits. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Local councils in New South Wales have been given the authority under 
section 625 of the Local Government Act (1993) to invest monies that are not 
required for immediate use in a range of financial instruments.  This authority to 
invest monies that has been derived from the ratepayers within each community, 
has a number of restrictions with respect to the types of allowed investment 
types, which are imposed by the NSW Department of Local Government.  
The NSW Department of Local Government is a State Government 
regulatory agency responsible for implementing the Local Government Act of 
1993.  In addition, the department also provides policy advice to the NSW State 
Government, manages the relationship between councils and the State 
Government and is responsible for the financial framework under which local 
governments operate (DLG 2008a).  The other major role undertaken by the 
NSW Department of Local Government is to work with the councils so they are 
able to appropriately deliver services to their communities (DLG 2008a). 
This paper looks at the significant financial exposure, identified in the Cole 
report (2008), of a number of councils in NSW with respect to their investments 
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in structured financial products such as collateralised debt obligations (CDO) and 
the impact of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc who managed 
many of the councils‟ investments.  The paper also considers how those councils 
have disclosed their exposure to CDO‟s in the financial reports of 2007/08, how 
their auditors have addressed the problem through their audit reports and the 
potential impact on local councils in NSW ability to continue to provide services 
for their constituents. 
2. BACKGROUND TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN 
AUSTRALIA 
Australia operates under a three tier government system consisting of Federal 
(Commonwealth) government; state government and, local government (Boon et 
al, 2005).  The Commonwealth (Federal) government oversee a federation 
consisting of six states and two territories and have been granted the authority 
under the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1900 (Burritt and Welch 1997). 
Within the States and Territories are local government councils who, in 
Australia, are responsible for building and maintaining roads; developing 
infrastructure for essential services, such as water supply and providing waste 
removal, community sporting facilities and care services such as child and aged 
care (Boon et al, 2005).  The State and Territory governments are responsible for 
specifying the powers and responsibilities of the local government entities within 
each state (Boon et al, 2005).  Due to the omission of any mention of Local 
Government authorities within the Commonwealth Constitution (Stilwell and 
Troy 2000) Local Government councils are reliant on the states and territories for 
authority to perform their functions and to raise funds.  Local Government 
powers continue to be defined and controlled by State Government ministers 
who have the authority to remove or reduce Local Government powers and 
responsibilities, or even change their boundaries (Stilwell and Troy 2000, p. 
924).  Nevertheless, Local Governments understand and appreciate the local and 
regional issues better than either the Federal or State Governments and it is the 
local councils that are the “most sensitive to” community interests, even though 
they have been “relegated to a subordinate role” (Stilwell and Troy 2000, p. 
909).  This paper focuses on the local government councils in the Australian state 
of New South Wales (NSW). 
2.1 Councils in New South Wales 
In NSW the first piece of legislation to establish a system of local 
government was passed in 1842 under the NSW South Wales Constitution Act 
1842.  This Act provided the Governor of NSW power to “create district councils 
for the purpose of constructing and maintaining roads, police services, water 
supply and a variety of other local services and infrastructure requirements” 
(Dredge 2001, p. 358).  The Governor was also given the power to appoint the 
wardens and councillors to the 28 district councils he [and it was always a he] 
had established (Dredge 2001).  This Act was repealed in 1858 when the 
Municipalities Act 1858 passed.  The Act introduced the notion of representative 
government; however the population of some of the municipalities were of a size 
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that it was not financially possible for them to undertake the tasks for which they 
were created (Dredge 2001).  Like the 1842 Act the Municipalities Act 1858 was 
repealed and the new Act was passed in 1867; however the problem of financial 
inefficiencies with small councils continued (Dredge 2001). 
After Federation in 1901, when “the separate colonies of the then British 
Empire in Australia decided to join together” (APH 2008, p.1), a new Act was 
passed in 1906 which recognised the needs of non rate paying members of the 
community.  According to Dredge (2001) this Act “represented a great advance 
for local government in NSW, establishing the major principles by which 
modern local government operated (2001, p. 365).  The principles of the 1906 
Act were reflected in the 1919 Act which was in place for the next seventy four 
years until the current NSW Local Government Act 1993 was passed.   
The NSW Local Government Act 1993 reflects the changes society has 
experienced over the past one hundred years including the significant economic 
and technological changes and the changing requirements of society and 
society‟s expectations of local government.  The 1993 Act was meant to include 
provisions to accommodate the changes society has undergone by emphasising 
“greater accountability by councils to their communities; more professional 
management of the day-to-day activities of councils; and increased flexibility to 
devise methods of efficient service delivery and the performance of regulatory 
activities” (Dredge 2001, p. 370).  However, the two main limitations imposed 
on local government remain; the relatively small size of councils which inhibits 
financial effectiveness and the level of power held by the State government. 
One way to overcome the associated efficiency problems of small councils 
has been the development and implementation of a number of reforms to the 
financial reporting requirements of local governments.  These reforms, which 
included identification and reporting on key performance measures and reporting 
on a financial year basis rather than a calendar year, occurred in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, and were promoted on the basis that they would improve the 
usefulness for decision making and enhance accountability (Carnegie 2005).  
The next section will discuss the financial reporting obligations of the NSW local 
government councils and the audit of those financial reports. 
2.2 NSW Local Government Financial Reporting and Audit 
Section 413 of the NSW Local Government Act 1993 [hereafter the 1993 
Act] requires NSW councils to prepare each year financial reports which include 
the general purpose financial reports of the council as well as an audit report 
which includes the opinion of an external auditor on the general purpose 
financial reports.  The general purpose financial reports of the council are to be 
audited by the council‟s auditor within four months after the end of the financial 
year (section 416) and the auditor is to issue a report which includes a statement 
“as to whether, in the opinion of the auditor, the council‟s accounting records 
have been kept in accordance with the requirements” (section 417).  This is 
similar to the normal reporting requirements of private sector organisations 
however the objectives of private sector organisations are significantly different 
to those of a local government council.  The local government councils are there 
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to support and provide specific services to their local community.  Many of the 
assets of local government councils are considered to be public goods which 
differ to private sector assets because public goods are generally non-rival and 
non-excludable (Barton 2002, p. 43).  For example public parks and roads, which 
are public goods available for all members of the community and the use of these 
goods by one member of the community does not deprive another member of the 
community use of the public good. 
The other area of commonality, in relation to the financial reporting and 
financial accountability, between private sector organisations and local 
government councils is found in section 422 of the 1993 Act which outlines the 
requirements for the appointment by the local government council of an external 
financial report auditor.  This commonality creates a level of confusion as the 
financial reports of most public sector organisations are generally audited by a 
state audit office.  For example Federal government organisations in Australia 
are required to have their financial reports audited by the Australian National 
Audit Office, while State government entities are audited by the State 
government‟s Audit Office.  However, the NSW local government councils are 
required to “appoint a person as its auditor” who is a registered company auditor, 
or a partnership or corporation which includes a registered company auditor 
(section 422).  In addition the local government councils are required to 
undertake compulsory audit tendering every six years (Boon et al, 2005, p. 221).  
One of the outcomes of compulsory tendering has been the introduction of 
“significant on-going competition to the local government audit market in NSW 
to produce long-term savings” (Boon et al, 2005, p. 222); however is this 
outcome what members of the community would expect? The result of 
competitive tendering for audit services has resulted in reduced quality of audits 
due to the necessary budget constraints arising from lower audit receipts 
(Houghton et al, 2003, Karen 2002). 
3. NSW LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPOSURE 
Sikka et al (2009, p. 136) explain that since late 2007 there has been a 
“deepening banking and financial crisis arising from sub-prime lending practices 
by banks, which in turn has restricted the availability of credit and has led to 
what has come to be described as a „credit crunch‟”.  There have been numerous 
accusations about who should be blamed for the crisis from the over reliance of 
neoliberal ideologies believing the market is able to take care of itself, to the 
excessive greed of those charged with the running and directing the financial 
institutions (Roskham 2008, p.9) and poor government regulation (Zingales, 
2008) and “market complacency brought about by several years of positive 
returns” (Zingales, 2008, p. 2).  Whatever the reason, whoever is the cause, the 
end result is very clear, the global financial markets have, and continue, to 
decline.  The impact of the financial crisis has been widespread and profound.  
Many people have lost their jobs, many have lost their life savings and 
investments and others have seen their superannuation balances decrease or even 
disappear.  Significant impacts have been felt by a wide variety of individuals, as 
well as organisations such as councils in NSW.   
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In the financial year 2007-08 the NSW the Local government sector was a 
$7.3 billion industry with the councils collecting $3.5 billion in rates and charges 
(DLG 2008b, p. 6).  Unlike the majority of other public sector organisations the 
local councils in NSW have been allowed, under the 1993 Act, to invest in a 
variety of investment schemes for the purpose of earning additional revenue.  As 
at 30 June 2007 the face value of the total investments of NSW local councils 
totalled $5.7 billion.  Given the size of the investments, which have varying 
degrees of risk, and the fluctuating economic conditions in 2007 (DLG 2008c) 
and the growing global impact from the sub-prime crisis in the United States, the 
NSW Department of Local Government commissioned a review of the councils 
investments.  In April 2008 the final report, the Cole Report, of the 
commissioned Review of NSW Local Government Investments was published.  
The purpose of the review was to verify the total investment exposure of NSW 
local government councils as well as determine the extent of unrealized losses 
from these investments (Cole 2008, p. 3).  This report was commissioned to 
address the NSW State government‟s concerns about the impact of the decline in 
the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States on the investments of 
councils.  Table 1 outlines the exposure identified in the final report 
 
Table 1. Cole Report Estimate of Exposure Levels 
 
Investment 
Type 
Face Value 
@ 30/6/07 
($m) 
Market 
Value @ 
31/1/08 ($m) 
Estimated 
Loss ($m) 
Estimated 
Loss (%) 
CDO 590 390 200 34% 
Capital protected 450 400 50 11% 
Managed Funds 2,420 2,350 70 3% 
Subordinated 
debt 
600 600 Nil Nil 
Term Deposit, 
cash, bills 
1,630 1,630 Nil Nil 
Total 5,690 5,370 320 5.6% 
 
Council funds are primarily composed of two types; short term working 
capital, which accounts for approximately 70 percent of the total, and longer 
term funds comprising the 30 percent residual, which includes capital 
expenditure commitments (Cole 2008, p9).  It appears that councils have 
maintained higher levels of security over the short term funds by investing in 
traditional fixed interest products, which does not appear to be the case with 
respect to the longer term investments.  The purpose of investing long term funds 
should be to ensure that the return generated is sufficient to negate the negative 
impact of inflation on future capital works.  However, Cole (2008) highlighted 
that NSW councils were attracted to higher prospective returns available by 
investing in new investment types that differed from the traditional fixed interest 
products (p9-10). 
These new investment types were specifically engineered to meet the 
requirements of the Investment Order and while compliance with the conditions 
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were essential to allow councils to invest, it should not have been the only or 
sufficient requirement to qualify these types of investment, as NSW councils are 
also required to comply with their fiduciary responsibilities as trustees of public 
funds (Cole 2008, p10).  Commonly the principle investment amounts were 
credit rated or bank guaranteed, however the income stream from the 
investments were not.  Simple compliance with the Investment Order was a 
liberal interpretation, of fulfilling the requirements and expectations associated 
with managing public monies, and did little to account for the risk associated 
with these types of financial instruments.  
The biggest exposure for NSW local government councils is in relation to the 
investments in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) where the investments are 
in “asset backed securities whose underlying collateral is typically a portfolio of 
bonds or bank loans” (Duffie and Garleanu 2001, p. 41).  The face value of the 
investments in CDOs dropped from $590m on 30th June 2007 to $390m on 30th 
June 2008, an estimated loss of $200 million (Cole 2008, p. 3).   
The main promoter of CDO‟s to the NSW local government councils was 
Lehman Brothers who were “notorious for marketing investment schemes to 
local councils which have resulted in those councils losing millions of 
ratepayer‟s dollars” (Roskam, 2008, p. 9).  Unfortunately for millions of 
investors, including NSW local government councils who invested in Lehmans 
Brothers‟ financial investment schemes and the people employed by Lehman 
Brothers, the investment bank filed for bankruptcy on 14th September 2008.  
Zingales suggests the aggressive leverage policy of Lehman Brothers‟, “bad 
regulation, lack of transparency, and market complacency brought about by 
several years of positive returns” (2008, p. 2) led to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.  This collapse, of the fourth largest investment bank in the United 
States, “is generally credited with precipitating the near total collapse of 
confidence that subsequently engulfed the international monetary system” 
(Roskam, 2008, p. 9). 
In response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers the NSW Department of 
Local Government issued a Council Circular to all NSW councils, two days after 
the collapse, on the 16th September 2008 requiring councils to “seek urgent 
financial advice as to their potential exposure to Lehman Brothers, as a matter of 
urgency.  Councils are required [emphasis added] to identify investments that 
have direct exposure to Lehman Brothers and outline the effect it may have on 
the Council‟s activities” (DLG, 2008c).   
The Cole report (2008) estimates that overall NSW councils have lost $320 
million from their investment portfolio, which represents 5.6 percent of total 
investments and 15.2 percent of long term funds (p11).  The problem with 
interpreting these figures is that most of these losses are from unrealised 
investment portfolios and the valuations of future returns have generally been 
provided by those who were also involved in marketing the products to councils.  
Therefore the future returns may potentially be significantly overstated and Cole 
(p11) identified the exposure in one case to be 85 percent of the capital 
investment.  Additionally, a number of councils are holding 45 percent of their 
total investments in financial instruments; such as CDO‟s, which potentially 
Local Government Investment: A Form of Gambling?  43 
have the greatest risk of loss. 
NSW councils seem to have pursued a policy of either chasing higher returns 
or allowing themselves to be lured into investments containing higher risk 
factors than they have traditionally accepted.  It is unclear if there was a true 
understanding of the relationship between higher risk and return trade-off.  The 
up side of accepting higher risk was capped at “a couple of percent above the 
risk free rate” (Cole 2008, p11), yet the downside, as stated previously, has been 
recorded as 85 percent of the original investment.  This suggests that some local 
council‟s failed to understand that taking on higher risk could generate higher 
returns or potentially higher losses. 
3.1 Audit function 
Sequeria and Johnson (2004) state that “the audit function has assumed the 
role of conferring credibility on the financial statements and ensuring that the 
statements could be relied on for decision making” (p. 94).  Karan (2003, p16-
17)  illustrated that the accounting professional bodies describe the audit process 
as serving the public interest by providing increased accountability.  ASA 200 
(2007) states “the objective of an audit is to enable the auditor to express an 
opinion as to whether the financial report is prepared in all material respects, in 
accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework.  The auditor is 
required to obtain a level of certainty that will enable them to provide 
„reasonable assurance‟ about the correctness of the financial reports”.  This 
terminology demonstrates that the auditor does not provide a guarantee of 
complete accuracy, by reason of the normal conduct of an audit.  The auditor 
conducts tests and collects evidence in respect of the accuracy of accounts, but 
does not audit all transactions or balances.  Therefore to reduce the chance of 
material misstatement, areas that are judged by the auditor to be high risk are 
likely to attract greater attention.   
Boon, McKinnon and Ross (2008, p93) explain that stakeholders need to 
have confidence that the audit report is reliable so they are able to make 
appropriate informed decisions on the financial reports.  To improve the level of 
confidence in the financial statements, and the subsequent audit report, 
organisations use external independent auditors to conduct the financial 
statement audit.  External auditors, “auditors independent from the entity” (Gay 
and Simnett 2007, p. 765), when conducting an audit of local government 
councils‟  General and Special Purpose Financial reports are required to prepare 
a report on the council‟s financial reports which includes a statement as to 
whether, in the opinion of the auditor [emphasis added] the financial reports 
have been prepared as required, are consistent with the council‟s records and 
fairly present the financial position of the council (1993 Act, section 417 (2)).  
The purpose of the audit is to provide assurance about whether the financial 
reports have been prepared in accordance with both the relevant accounting 
standards and with the Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and 
Financial Reporting.  However, providing assurance does not guarantee there are 
no errors, omissions or that no fraudulent activities have taken place.  Rather the 
audit reports are supposed to provide a level of confidence that the financial 
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information provided can be relied upon, particularly by the stakeholders of the 
councils in making decisions based upon the financial information contained in 
the financial reports.   
The audit profession is no different to other professions; it requires its 
members to be independent through avoiding other economic ties with the client, 
and to be absolutely objective in their approach to the audit and the client (Umar 
and Anandarajan, 2004).  To be able to issue an appropriate audit opinion, one of 
the fundamental principles of professional ethics is that of objectivity which is 
the principle that “an auditor should not allow prejudices or bias, conflict of 
interest or undue influence of others to override professional or business 
judgement” (Gay and Simnett 2007, p. 17).  To meet the fundamental principle 
of objectivity it is vital that auditors are and are seen to be independent.  This 
view is consistent with Arens et al (2007) who explain that to be independent an 
auditor must be free from any bias in relation to all aspects of the audit 
engagement  
The following extract from the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
outlines the requirement of independence of external financial statement 
auditors: 
Independence requires: 
Independence of Mind 
The state of mind that permits the expression of a conclusion without being 
affected by influences that compromise professional judgment, allowing an 
individual to act with integrity, and exercise objectivity and professional 
skepticism. 
Independence in Appearance 
The avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a 
reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant 
information, including safeguards applied, would reasonably conclude a 
Firm’s, or a member of the Assurance Team’s, integrity, objectivity or 
professional skepticism had been compromised. (APES 110, Section 290.8) 
To determine if an auditor is independent, all the relevant circumstances, 
including all relationships between the audit client and the auditor need to be 
considered (Hayes, 2002, p6).  However there are an increasing number of 
barriers to audit independence such as the expansion of the provision of non-
audit services, which has resulted in a decline in the relative importance of audit 
fees, co-modification of the audit, resulting in lower profits, reduced skills levels 
and reduction of resources allocated to the task (Hayes 2002, p. 3). 
The independent auditor is required to issue an opinion about whether the 
financial reports of the council being audited provide a true and fair view of the 
financial position and are in compliance with the Accounting Standards and 
relevant financial reporting regulations.  There are two main opinions an auditor 
can issue for a local government council‟s financial statements: an unqualified 
opinion which indicates the auditor is of the opinion that the council‟s financial 
statements do not contain any material misstatements and are a true and fair view 
of the council and are in compliance with the Accounting Standards; and a 
qualified opinion which is where the auditors are of the opinion the council‟s 
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financial statements contain certain circumstances which are material or are 
likely to be material (Gay and Simnett 2007) and may, if relied upon by 
decisions makers, result in an incorrect decision being taken. 
The assessment of materiality and relative importance of qualitative and 
quantitative factors are matters for the auditors‟ judgement (AuAH 2009, p56).  
Items that represent more than 10 percent of the balance of any account are 
normally considered material, items that are between 5 and 10 percent of any 
account are normally only material at the discretion of the auditor and items that 
are less than 5 percent are normally considered not material.  However, the 
overriding factor is if inclusion or exclusion of the information would influence 
the decision making process of the users of the reports.  Therefore items that 
only affect an account by 1 percent may be judged to be material if the auditor 
believes that providing information about the matter may affect the stakeholders‟ 
decision making process. 
The importance of independence of financial report auditors cannot be 
underestimated; however independence does not guarantee an appropriate audit 
opinion: 
“As independent experts, auditors claim to be able to mediate uncertainty 
and construct an objective account of business affairs to enable shareholders 
and significant other to manage risks.  This construction of reality is 
legitimised by appeals to a variety of standards, benchmarks, techniques and 
bodies of knowledge, but such claims are precarious as they are routinely 
undermined by periodic scandals, crisis, frauds, emergence of new 
technologies, patterns of trade and changes in capitalistic economies” (Sikka 
et al 2009, p. 136). 
It should be clear that performance indicators (such as financial reports) 
ought to be “both audited and publicly disclosed” in the interests of 
accountability and transparency (Carnegie, 2005, p85). 
NSW councils invested in CDO portfolios in the hope of generating higher 
than normal returns from their long term investments. These investments were 
aggressively marketed, including by Lehman Brothers, as complying with the 
Investment Order for NSW Local councils. This order requires councils which 
are able to invest, to invest in those securities that had a minimum credit rating 
from Moody‟s Investment Services Inc, Standard and Poor‟s Investment Services 
Inc or Fitch Rating. Prior to the downgrades that subsequently occurred, the 
investments by NSW local councils were AAA, then AA and AA-, which met 
the minimum requirements, however by February 2008 they were CCC-. Yet 
even prior to the downgrade the market was strongly suggesting that the “credit 
rating was far too optimistic and would significantly deteriorate” (Cole 2008 
p11). 
Funds held by NSW local councils, that they are allowed to invest, fall into 
two categories and are classed as restricted or unrestricted in respect of their final 
use. In particular restricted funds may have additional conditions related to them. 
These funds include monies from developer contributions, environmental levies, 
or leave entitlements. However reporting by councils appear to pool together 
these funds leaving it unclear where they have invested funds to meet particular 
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liabilities or long term investment strategies (Cole 2008 p 18-19). Councils seem 
to fund their long term liabilities from a single pool of investments irrespective 
of whether the funds have restrictions placed on them or if they are associated 
with particular liabilities (Cole 2008 p19).  This makes assessing councils ability 
to fund particular long term liabilities extremely difficult. Cole (2008) made 
some recommendations and suggested that councils should be reminded of their 
inability to “contract out” fiduciary responsibilities to external funds managers, 
that product manufacturers be banned from providing advice to councils, and that 
the NSW DLG should release a formal model of investment guidelines (Cole, 
2008 cited in Gold 2008 p42).  One of the major impacts of local council losses 
from CDOs is that much of these funds were earmarked for future projects.  
These projects will not only be impacted by these losses, but will also be 
impacted by the decline in value of the funds due to diminished or nil returns. In 
addition, the impact of inflationary pressures will also make those projects less 
viable and possibly require additional funds to complete. 
3.2  Audit Reports 
Analysis conducted of the audited financial reports of NSW council‟s have 
shown that a large proportion of external auditors used the exact same wording 
for reporting on CDO‟s, and in some cases within specific accounting firms used 
a standard letter of qualification with spaces to hand write in details such as page 
numbers.  This highlights that these were generic reports, which therefore raises 
concerns about the independence of these audit reports and the level of effort in 
undertaking the audit.  Commonality of wording both within audit firms and 
between audit firms could be an attempt to create a common response to the 
issue which would be an indicator of lack of auditor independence. It also 
highlights that the reporting of the impacts of the financial crisis has failed to 
provide sufficient independent evidence of the true losses. 
Auditors that conducted audits of a number of councils also formed a variety 
of opinions.  There was no evidence to suggest that they just assumed problems 
due to the sub prime mortgage market, which suggests that the audits were 
probably conducted independently.  However the format of the qualified report 
on the sub-prime problems was generally consistent not only within particular 
audit firms but also between audit firms.  This suggests that audit firms have 
applied a standard reporting form to disclose issues relating to the sub prime 
mortgage market problems and in the cases of the councils that Cole (2008) 
identified as at risk, all had qualified audit opinions identifying the uncertainty 
related to valuation of CDO investments.  While this could be expected, it was 
surprising to discover that the values reported were the same as reported by Cole 
in February 2008. This implies that councils and in turn the auditors accepted 
those values without reporting the continued decline in value. 
Other findings from the review of the financial reports have shown that the 
audit fees disclosed within the reports are ambiguous, with separate audit fees 
relating to a number of audit functions including, but not limited to, audits of the 
financial reports.  This raises questions with respect to the independence of 
auditors if there is fee reliance on additional audit functions.  Craswell (1999) 
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suggested that qualified audit reports are a strong indicator that independence has 
not been compromised, due to the competitive nature of auditing.  However this 
may not be true in the public sector if there are limited firms willing to engage in 
auditing of Local Government bodies.  Additionally Craswell (2002) suggested 
that qualified audit reports are a strong indicator that independence has not been 
compromised, due to the competitive nature of auditing.  This may not be true in 
the public sector if there are limited firms willing to engage in auditing of local 
government bodies.  If it is an indicator then the high proportion of qualified 
audit reports would show that independence is being maintained. 
The introduction of competitive tendering for NSW local government 
financial statement auditing in the 1993 Act has introduced the possibility that 
auditors may experience greater time budget pressures.  A recent survey 
concerning reduced audit quality identified 48 percent of participants admitted to 
having to reduce audit quality practices during the completion phase of the audit, 
which includes the review for subsequent events (Coram, Ng and Woodliff. 
2003).  This would suggest that with complex issues such as the losses related to 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, auditors may not allocate sufficient time to 
determine the full extent of the losses.  
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has identified the high exposure that a number of local councils in 
NSW have to CDO‟s.  This has resulted in financial investments that are unlikely 
to provide sufficient returns of both initial capital and capital growth needed to 
meet the planned obligations and liabilities for which the financial investments 
were intended.  It has also highlighted that there is a need to improve the 
standards for measurement and reporting of these types of investments.  
Similarly it suggests that some local council‟s either do not understand, or do not 
have the capacity to properly manage the fiduciary duty requirements associated 
with controlling public funds.  There appears to have been large amounts of trust 
placed in providers of the financial investment products and a lack of 
consideration given to the risk versus reward of different financial investment 
products.  Additionally this paper has highlighted a number of areas of interest 
for further research.  Why has there been a standard reporting method of the sub-
prime issues?  Is it a result of suggestions from the local government association, 
ease of completion, or a perceived need to be consistent in reporting?  As 
identified by Cole (2008) there is a need for a standard analysis and reporting 
method to be developed for local councils. 
Councils are required to report the fees that they have paid to auditors and the 
financial reports show these fees.  However, from analysis of the financial 
reports and audit reports, there does seem to be a lack of clarity as to what those 
fees are for.  For example some councils‟ have shown an audit fee presumably 
for the audit of the financial reports, and then have also shown other audit fees.  
While it is likely, and may be presumed that the other audit fees are for audits of 
particular sectors such as OHS, water or environment, it needs to be clarified for 
a number of reasons.  For example, if the same firm is conducting the additional 
audits, and the fees earned from the addition work is substantially greater than 
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from the audit of the financial reports, there may be some compromise of the 
independence of the financial audit.  Likewise it may affect the competiveness of 
the tender process if some firms are unable to conduct the additional audits. 
Another important element arising from this research is that councils do not 
separate funds that relate to particular liabilities or that have separate restrictions 
associated with them.  There are also inconsistencies among the accounting 
policies that therefore impede transparency (Cole 2008 p24).  Current reporting 
policies seem to ignore the risk that particular products may need to be liquidated 
prior to maturity triggering losses that would need to be reported.  One solution 
to this would be to promote the use of current market valuations across the full 
range of investment products.  There seems to be a strong need to improve 
consistency of the reporting, and the accounting methods used to account for, 
and value these products, as well as providing additionally support and guidance 
to local government authorities to enable them to understand financial 
investment products and the fiduciary responsibilities they have for managing 
public moneys. 
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